Red Line - This week we discuss Pakistani president Zardari's visit to Europe, 2008 war in South Ossetia and David Cameron

Sergei Strokan: Welcome to the Voice of Russia and its new weekend program Red Line. Every weekend we, Sergei Strokan, Mira Salganik and Ekaterina Kudashkina, discuss the most significant events of the week.

Ekaterina Kudashkina: Moscow is immersed in acid fumes coming from burning peat bogs and forests, temperature is stubbornly clinging to 40 c on thermometers, rain is not even mentioned in weather reports, but the three of us continue with our program, don’t we?

Mira Salganik: Sure! And as always we start with Beyond the Headlines. This is Red Line first heading to discuss the world mainstream event.

Ekaterina Kudashkina: As it is we go from fire to water. We are going to talk of catastrophic floods in Pakistan. Or rather, of their potential aftermath.Natural disasters are not unstrained by state borderlines. This one lashed out at three states: Pakistan, India and China. The worst hit was Pakistan – about 12 million are reported to be affected. Flooding has also taken a toll over the border in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Flash floods have killed at least 132 people in the Himalayan region of Ladakh. Mudslides engulfed a town in northwest China, killing at least 80 people and leaving 2,000 residents missing as rescue teams dug through crushed homes and readied a blast to dislodge debris blocking a river. 450 000 had to be evacuated from calamity zone.I hate to sound callous but there is little doubt that governments of India and China will do the needful to restore the damage. Dead will be buried, survivors rehabilitated. But I have serious misgivings about Pakistan.

Sergei Strokan: So do I. not because Pakistan has suffered much greater damage than India or China. The country is facing a major humanitarian catastrophe. The scale of the floods is unprecedented – no need to give facts and figures already known world-wide. The backwash effect might be compared to consequences of 2005 destructive earthquake.Pakistan appealed to international community for emergency aid. It is reported that foreign aid organizations are playing a much bigger role than the government, though weather and floods hamper relief efforts.

Ekaterina Kudashkina: But then there are masses of reports both in Pakistani and the world media indicating that the army is massively involved in rescue operations. The army, which has maintained a dominant role in foreign and security policy even during civilian rule, has quickly stepped in to manage crisis.This fact could not but spark all manner of speculation about the intentions of the military. Would they go back to barracks after the rescue operations are over? Analysts say a takeover bid is highly unlikely – the army wants to go on with war.

Mira Salganik: On the other hand, the army can hardly boast of great victories over “Taliban insurgents”. Not to mention the crucial fact that the US-NATO led forces have already set the date for pulling out of Afghanistan, so whatever would  be  the reverberations – and I don’t think anyone can accurately outline them at present – Pakistani military will face  an entirely new equation.

Sergei Strokan: Don’t you think that army simply had to spearhead rescue operations because of government’s confusion and inability to act?President Asif Ali Zardari did not cancel his visit to France and Great Britain. The visit was unpopular even before it started. Even before the floods, some Pakistani politicians had suggested he cancel the trip after Cameron said on a visit to Pakistan's arch-rival India that Islamabad must not "look both ways" when dealing with Islamist militants. So, I have a feeling that President Zardari reputation was badly affected by his latest performance abroad.

Ekaterina Kudashkina: Meanwhile prime-minister Yusuf Raza Gilani visited a makeshift medical relief camp in the Punjab. The visit was widely publicized. However, after his visit, Pakistan's news organizations reported that the camp was a fake - established before Gilani's trip and dismantled immediately after he left. The disclosure and scandal did not mean Gilani’s personal loss of face. It was a heavy blow on reputation of civil authorities.

Mira Salganik: Pakistan’s political make-up is such that the real opposition in this country is not so much between political parties as between civil governance and military regime. These are permanent contestants for power.The country is 63 years old.  Approximately two-thirds of her life-span the country lived under military rule, so civil institutions are naturally weaker than military instruments of administration. Needless to say that it takes time and practice for civil institutions to grow into the soil of mass conscience.  Uprooted they can be easily.What I mean to say is that in a country like Pakistan, in time of devastation and panic, inefficiency at the top of civil administration might have grave consequences.

Sergei Strokan: In addition to two principal forces in Pakistan’s political arena there is a third one that is apparently gaining momentum.Let me try to describe it.Islamist charities affiliated with terrorist groups are competing with international efforts to provide relief to the millions of Pakistanis affected by massive floods. The charities became known five years back, in time of devastating earthquake of 2005. Prominent among them is a body called “Lashkar-e-Taiba” (LeT) reported to be affiliated with militant groups.Five years after Islamic charities with ties to militant groups aided victims of a deadly earthquake in Pakistan, earning good will as the country’s government struggled to respond, reports suggest that the same scenario may be unfolding again.

Ekaterina Kudashkina: I have seen reports that several Islamic charities are rushing to fill in a vacuum created by a slow response from the Pakistani government.It was reported that one of the groups involved in the response, Falah-e-Insaniyat, has ties to Jamat-ud-Dawa, an Islamic charity led by the founder of the banned militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was blamed for the 2008 attacks on the Indian city of Mumbai. Jamat-ud-Dawa is “widely viewed as a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba.”

Sergei Strokan: And last year, when up to two million people were displaced by fighting between government forces and the Taliban in the Swat valley, Islamist groups provided food, medical care and transportation to those in need, in the absence of effective aid from the government. At certain point the extremist organization had the most efficient response teams on the ground, and boasted the most functional and well-stocked relief camps. Its mobile X-ray machines and operating theaters made international headlines. Through their clever use of mobile technology, the group’s volunteers established an unparalleled communications infrastructure that facilitated relief work.

Mira Salganik: I want to draw your attention to what to me is an extremely important aspect of the third force’s strategy: the Pakistani Taliban is apparently trying to capitalize on the natural disaster by blaming its victims.A spokesman for the militants, Muhammad Umer, sent an e-mail to news organizations announcing a cease-fire in flood-affected regions and calling the disaster a form of divine retribution on enemies of the Islamist militants. Alias, enemies of Islam. “We are announcing a temporary suspension of mujahedeen activities in the flood-hit areas to give another opportunity to the people to seek forgiveness. We are immediately suspending operations but if the army or the government consider it as our weaknesses and commit any mistake, then the army, the government and the people will face dire consequences.”

Ekaterina Kudashkina: Sounds like an ultimatum, doesn’t it?

Mira Salganik: According to Britain’s Channel 4 News, the statement also said that Pakistanis in the region were “against Islam and Shariah,” or Islamic law, and “must repent and seek forgiveness and should pledge support to the mujahedeen and Islam.” How do you like this?

Sergei Strokan: I’d call it smart. But let us finally hear the voice from Islamabad. Now we are joined by Mr.Ehmed Kureshi, independent political analyst and columnist with News international.Mr. Kureshi, how do you assess chances of survival for the present government of Pakistan?

Ehmed Kureshi:  Well, whatever the chances of survival, these chances have certainly become worse aftermaths of the tragedy in Southern Pakistan after the collapse it is sad to say without any exaggeration really that we are seeing frankly for the first time a massive collapse of the elected democratic government in Pakistan. This massive collapse is the only reason why you are not feeling being allowed to inform the international media about this collapse because some of the aftershocks of this collapse have been medicated and controlled by the way the Pakistani military, the Navy, the army and the air force moved into action in addition to some of the private groups, some of the political groups to contain the disaster after the flood. Because of this immediate action some of the signs that you and I could have seen of this collapse in Pakistan, a massive civilian administrative collapse across the nation, we did not see some of the signs because they were contained but made no mistake about it.  During the past couple of weeks of flood we have not seen any senior, mid level, second level or third tier official in a federal government, in the provincial government, nor can we see them anywhere across the nation, all these cities, towns, villages they are flooded but the elected officials were not to be seen.

Mira Salganik: We are getting the reports here that some of the mujahidin that are connected with militant Islamic groups are doing quite a lot in relief operations. Is that so?

Ehmed Kureshi: Well, I just have some reservations about these quite a few people militants or Taliban. I know it gets confusing because when we talk about Taliban we mean the PTP the so-called Pakistani Taliban which are based on the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  These people are definitely considered terrorists by all Pakistanis that are involved in bombing for the past two years.  I doubt these people, I don’t know, I haven’t seen these people really come out anywhere to help or anything, we refer basically are religious group. This religious group may not necessarily be militants.

Sergei Strokan: Now we are joined by Boris Volhonsky, who is senior research fellow at the Moscow-based Institute of Oriental Studies. 

Mira Salganik: What do you think the Pakistani military, the army, would play in the in the nearest future?

Boris Volhonsky: Well, there are two aspects to my mind.  First thing is that the Pakistani army has always played a very important role in Pakistani politics, in domestic politics and to a great extent in a politics as such, including foreign policy. And we know that almost half of the independent development of Pakistan, almost half time of sixty something years of Pakistani’s independent development, it was the military who were heading the country. But at this moment it seems a little bit unlikely that army would look forward to taking the supreme power in the country. I think there are two reasons. First thing is that the military regime has ended quite recently, just a couple of years ago, and the memories of it are still very fresh, the country needs time to readjust to a new situation. The second thing is very practical. The army now is very busy with fighting Taliban in the border areas in the West of the country. It’s very unlikely that they will drop this concrete task, which is concretely for the army to follow, drop this task and go into wider politics.

Mira Salganik: You know that quite a number of political analysts believe that the army will not grab the seat at the top because they don’t want to take on responsibility for great deal of repair for rehabilitation of the country and things.  If the army is facing a choice, either they take on the responsibility for the country, destroyed as it is, or the country disintegrates, how would they answer?

Boris Volhonsky: Well, I don’t think that the army is afraid of taking responsibility because I’ve seen that after the earthquake of 2005 it was the army who headed the whole rehabilitation process in Kashmir, in Pakistani part of Kashmir, in so-called Azad Kashmir or Free Kashmir.  But it’s not the matter of responsibility because the army is generally probably the only force in the country which is conceding the ethnic limitations and religious limitations and everything. The army is probably not ready at this moment to look forward to grabbing the power because President Musharraf is a former general and chief of army staff, and the memories of that period are still fresh.  It usually takes some time between two military regimes in Pakistan. And for many reasons I think that Pakistan is going a proper process of civilian control over the army, despite all the difficulties that the country is facing.  The army is taking responsibility for what it is really responsible for, but not for some other wider aspects, wider and bigger aims.

Mira Salganik: Do you think that the army and Taliban, you know there have been rumors for a long time now that there are some kind of negotiations between Taliban and Pakistan.  By Pakistan sometimes or rather more often the government circles are meant,  but the military are also mentioned in this context.  After a battle in Swat it might be  a little bit difficult but still do you think that something could be cooking?

Boris Volhonsky: As I have already said, I think the army will not take any separate role from state as such. At this moment army is fighting the Taliban or the militants which are allegedly connected with the Taliban.  But as for the connection between Pakistani authorities and the Taliban it’s no secret that before 9/11 in 2001 there were very wide considerations by many political scientists that it’s not only Pakistan, but probably the world community as well, which will inevitably have to establish some context with maybe some sanctions, not very radical, but some modern sanctions within the Taliban. Because Taliban actually is the only force that can hold Pakistan together, which will prevent it from falling apart.  And now, especially after these UN reports n about the civilian casualties in Afghanistan and the failure of the whole American operation, I think that these considerations are coming back. And probably Pakistan will take its role in establishing this context. Much will be seen after the four party talks around Afghanistan.  Pakistan is invited to take part in these talks. And I’ve heard that there is going to be some kind of summit on this subject. 

Mira Salganik: Practically the situation in Pakistan and in Afghanistan now is sort of tied up. I mean the situation in Afghanistan and the situation in Pakistan are so close to each other, they are intertwined. 

Boris Volhonsky: Yes, they are close. Much will depend on how things go in Afghanistan and how thing go in Pakistan.

Sergei Strokan: Can you agree that for all  parties concerned, for all major political forces in Pakistan, these devastating floods is just a moment of truth and this is just another opportunity to find out who is who in Pakistan?

Boris Volhonsky: It’s always difficult to say during the moments of such  calamities as floods or fires, because these are really the times of disaster and the main purpose is to solve the problem but  I think that maybe after Pakistanis would say “insha allah,  come down”,  then probably it will be the moment of truth for them. And there will definitely be some people who will be held responsible for inadequate acting during these times. 

Sergei Strokan: Now let us come to our second heading Between the Lines to discuss the most thought-provoking publication of the week. I think we have no right to bypass the second anniversary of the five-day Caucasus war between Russia and neighboring Georgia. While the dust over the two years has settled the tragic events of August 2008 or 8/8/8, are well-remembered in Moscow and seemingly are not forgotten at the West. The textbook example is a thought-provoking analysis “How to square the Caucasian circle” which appeared in The Financial Times. The author is Thomas de Waal, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of the forthcoming ‘The Caucasus: An Introduction’ research.“Two years ago war broke out between Russia and Georgia. At the time many expressed fears of a new cold war between Moscow and the West”, - expert says adding that while cold war was luckily avoided basic disagreements over the results of the war still divide Moscow and its key Western partners. Let me quote the Financial Times piece to make a brief introduction to the subject. “In fact, relations have improved, but the situation in the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains deadlocked. While bonhomie has broken out between Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev on a range of issues, their governments still trade accusations over Georgia”, says Thomas de Waal.So, Mira and Katya, I believe this is a good point for us to start the discussion.

Mira Salganik: I think the author is right in his assessment that the East-West geopolitical crisis of major proportion remained only a threat, which has gone into history at has nothing to do with present-day reality. In fact, diplomats did a hard job and leaders of global powers showed necessary restraint to tame the conflict. We can congratulate ourselves with it. I have recently checked what was written in the West about Russia’s actions two years back and the tone was highly negative. In the first months after the conflict broke out the Western media called it “Russia’s invasion of Georgia” grimly predicting that the August, 2008 war would mark a watershed in Russia’s relations with leading democracies. And as none of these things happened today we may say that they were a lot of short-lived forecasts.

Ekaterina Kudashkina: The other basic misconception was that Caucasian crisis would undermine the security in Europe largely due to Russia’s efforts. According to this theory Russia’s actions in  the five-day Caucasus war run counter to the aim of creating “a new security architecture in Europe” that was proclaimed in Berlin by President Dmitry Medvedev at the very start of his presidency. Some even gone far enough to say that this policy would inevitably condemn the country to the international isolation. And, as you hinted Mira, those loudmouth critics can eat their words now.

Sergei Strokan: Well, but let us come back to The Financial Times publication. Moscow insists that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now fully independent states, while  Washington reaffirms its support for Georgia’s claims on the two territories, says the author reminding the readers that during her recent visit to Tbilisi State Secretary Clinton again emphasized American support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, referring to the Russian presence in the separatist territories as “occupation”.Comparing Moscow and Washington stands, the author concludes: “A cool look at the facts suggests that neither position reflects the realities on the ground. South Ossetia, with a population of about 30,000, will never be independent, but the bloodshed of 2008 has set back any rapprochement with Georgia by many years. Abkhazia is much bigger and enjoys a sort of proto-statehood on its Black Sea coast. While it too has little chance of being recognized as independent, it has broken decisively with post-Soviet Georgia, of which it was never fully a part. Most Abkhaz welcome the Russian military presence as a guarantor of their security”.Mira, Katya, can we easily agree with this also?

Mira Salganik: Well, what is clear is that now, two years after the war both Abkhazia and South Ossetia look like totally separate entities with no way to rejoin Georgia. This is the reality which by no means could be denied if all sides concerned choose to speak in terms of real politic. Of course, one may refer to the fact that most of the world has not recognized them. And I would admit that the recognition would not come, at least not in foreseeable future.But let me put another question – is it the number of embassies or diplomatic missions opened which is primary criteria of the sustainability of a particular territory proclaiming her independence?

Ekaterina Kudashkina: Good question, Mira. Of course, the parallel with Taiwan is irrelevant, I understand it, but both of you would hopefully agree that de-facto independent state can look quite well-to-do compared to internationally recognized states which are in a bad shape.  Go to Africa, or Latin America – and you would find a lot of examples.

Sergei Strokan: Therefore, I believe we have to look at what are the basic elements of statehood established by both Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia in two years. And I can confidently say that they have made a certain progress – whether someone likes in or not – in creating foundation of a state as an institution.  Both governments are in full control, life is back to normalcy, construction is booming and in the case of Abkhazia trade and investment opportunities with neighboring states are already developed, though perhaps, not to the full gear.  So, this is reality and as Thomas de Waal rightly puts it “the global parties need to wind down their rhetoric and stop looking at these conflicts through a cold war prism”.  The next date to look forward to is 2014, when the Winter Olympics arrive on the Black Sea coast in Sochi, next door to Abkhazia. In fact, Olympics are a good groundwork that in four years’ time could be a reason for rapprochement. But let us hear what experts say. Now we are joined by Boris Makarenko, Head of the Moscow-based Center of Political Technologies.Mr. Makarenko, two years after the five-day Caucasus war how do you view its major implications for Russia’s relations with the West?

Boris Makarenko: The most measuring implication is that Russia and the West agreed to disagree and to reduce this problem to limited damages.  Russia and the West continue to cooperate and compete in various spheres, everywhere, with the exception of one small room in Geneva, where occasionally under international umbrella Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia do not talk to each other and there the crisis remains in its hot faze.  It happened months ago, US President Barak Obama returned to the Congress the ratification of so-called 123 Treaty which opens up avenues for cooperation between the United States and Russia in the field of atomic energy. Something that the former President Bush recalled from the Congress as a punishment for Russia’s behavior in the Georgian conflict.  Now even that implication is over.  Otherwise, Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain for all practical purposes non-recognized by the international community, with a very few insignificant exceptions. The danger of another conflict is not completely eliminated, but remains lessened. Russian relations with Georgia are nowhere, that’s the major implications. 

Sergei Strokan: Do you see any way to bridge the enormous gap in the assessment of the situation as the Geneva talks on Caucasus conflict between parties concerned are deadlocked? When would pragmatism finally prevail?

Boris Makarenko: I believe pragmatism did prevail.  Remaining disagreement between Russia and the West over the studies of these territories does not affect Russian relations with EU and the United States in a significant way. Pragmatism is not in recognizing or not recognizing independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  International relation shows that national community may refrain from recognizing the fact of existing realities for decades, and nothing happens.  Look at the West Bank, the Gaza Strip.  Look at the Northern Cyprus.  The pragmatism is to continue to build up relationship and eventually, with time, to come to address not the superficial manifestations of the conflict, but its roots.  Earlier or later Russia and Georgia will have to restore relations.  Earlier or later the Western world will have to decide what to do and how to treat Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  

Sergei Strokan: Thank, you, Boris.

Mira Salganik: And now we are joined by Victor Mizin, professor OF the Moscow-based Institute of International relations.Professor Mizin, August, 2008 war marked a watershed in Russia’s relations with global powers. I know you have made a recent research of this. What are your main conclusions?

Victor Mizin: You know, talking to some experts in the West, especially in NATO countries, or reading some mass media pieces, you may get an idea that it, as they call it, a war, a war between Russia and Georgia. Of course, I think we shouldn’t consider it as a war, because any war between Russia which is a major, global power and a mini skilled Georgia is impossible, of course. Georgia could be swept of the map, if the Russian troops wanted it.  And it wasn’t the war. It wasn’t, as President Medvedev called it, “pressing or forcing Georgia to recognize international law and protecting Russian citizens”. So, it was Russian rebuff of very untidy and naughty Georgian aggression.  This event has marked some kind of a break out point in Russian international policy.  From now on, Russia would forcefully protect its international vital interests, as well as the rights and the lives of its citizens, and we know that many South Ossetians and Abkhazians now have Russian passports. So, they are like the citizens of Russia. And, of course, it was a very tough decision for President Medvedev as he recognized a few days ago, but Russia was literally conversed into making this kind of step. And unfortunately, the Saakashvili regime has done everything to demonize itself, and I think that never, never in the future the population of South Ossetia and Abkhazia would want to come back and to reinstate themselves as the integral parts of Georgia. So, it’s only the Saakashvili regime which to blame. But we practically know meaningful reaction in the West. Of course, they revise some old Soviet era style accusation that Russia tries to become hegemonic in the territory of the former Soviet Union. But even most hot-headed rusophobic politicians in NATO understood that any kind of sanction, any kind of strong statements of accusation against Russia, were impossible. So I think they understood the logic of this Russian position,  of the Russian move when Russia acted to protect its own national interests as the regional and as the global state, and to protect the lives of the allied countries.

Sergei Strokan: Now we move to our next heading – Man in News.I believe that this time the man who really hit the headlines – or, to be more precise, has been doing so for a couple of weeks – is David Cameron.As the youngest British prime-minister in 200 years 43-year old Cameron has recently got into the limelight for a whole number of statements which sparked surprise, furor and even indignation. However, I believe there’s another good reason to talk about Cameron which is – his first 100 days at Downing Street, 10. David Cameron became Britain’s new prime minister – the first Conservative prime-minister in 13 years – on the 10 of May, 2010, after Gordon Brown resigned amid expectation that after inconclusive general election the Conservatives would form a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats.  Today the fastest pens of British media are quick to note that Cameron has been acting in a somewhat daring manner, stunning some of his allies, angering others and producing stark contrast with his predecessor, Gordon Brown.

Mira Salganik: Oh, yes, I’d say, his first 100 days in office ended in a high note. In the past two weeks David Cameron offended Israel by comparing Gaza to a "prison camp"; got his history of the Second World War wrong, and said that Iran "has got a nuclear bomb”.The recent blunder was a bad one. During a question-and-answer session with the public Cameron was asked why he was supporting Turkey's interest in joining the European Union.The Prime Minister replied that Turkish membership could help to address problems "like the Middle East peace process, like the fact that Iran has got a nuclear weapon".Later Cameron acknowledged, he “misspoke”. Several days earlier speaking during his visit to US Cameron went on to describe Britain as America's "junior partner" against the Germans in 1940. After a lady in the audience pointed out to his slip, Cameron replied: "What I meant to say was that I was referring to the 1940s, not 1940. You are absolutely right and I was absolutely wrong."

Ekaterina Kudashkina: This time he acknowledged he was wrong. But, sometimes Cameron would stand by his remarks, however uncomfortable these might appear. During his recent visit to India the British Premier put his country on the verge of a diplomatic scandal, accusing Pakistan of double standards in dealing with terrorism threat by suggesting it "promotes the export of terror.” His remarks came days after U.S. military reports published on the WikiLeaks website detailed concerns Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency had aided Taliban militants fighting in Afghanistan – and days before the planned visit to Britain of the Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari.Not surprising, pressure mounted on Zardari to cancel his visit to Britain.

Sergei Strokan: Well, Katya, it looks like a diplomatic row between Britain and Pakistan has been hushed down, but it’s not the only row in which the British Prime minister has been involved. In the past week, Mr. Cameron set off a domestic row. At another question-and-answer session he came up saying that people who were granted cheap subsidized housing should have it for a fixed term, not for life as it is now.This had not previously been flagged as government policy. It angered his coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, who would oppose it.Like The Economist Magazine put it, “Of course, the risks - of coming across to the world as clumsy rather than canny, of provoking more anger than intended, of gaining nothing for all the candor - are serious. But then Mr. Cameron is turning out to be an unexpectedly audacious prime minister all round. His foreign ventures are provocative. His domestic policy program is, in its fiscal austerity and zeal for decentralization, decidedly radical.”  

Mira Salganik: In fact, Cameron, who formed Britain's first coalition since 1945, is now trying to sell to its people an ambitious – and painful – program of reforms. Some analysts even come to describe Cameron’s government as a "breakneck coalition". Finance minister George Osborne will announce details of the unprecedented austerity measures on October 20.

Ekaterina Kudashkina: Cameron wants to reduce the size of government, transfer more responsibility to local people and expand the voluntary sector's role. He says lack of public money is exactly why the state should rely on charities, volunteers and local people, rather than "micro-managing" communities with endless programs."We've got the biggest budget deficit in the G20," he said in his speech in July. "It's time for something different... something that doesn't just pour money down the throat of wasteful, top-down government schemes."

Sergei Strokan: Analysts say that reform of schools, policing and local government was expected. Big cuts to spending are unavoidable. But the ambitious proposed reforms to the NHS and the welfare state came totally unexpected. Most of them question the success of the ambitious plans, pointing to public apathy, union opposition, strains within the ruling coalition and a shortage of funding.

Ekaterina Kudashkina: Now we are joined by Steven Fielding , director of the Center for British Politics, University of Nottingham.  Hello, Professor. What are your general  impressions of the first hundred days of Mr.Cameron’s government?

Steven Fielding: Well, I think he’s doing very well. He’s been able to frame what he wanted to do over the next four of five years in  the government.  He’s made it very clear what his objectives are. And in terms of the short-term, which is to reduce the sizes government spending.   And he’s also tried to establish that it’s not only short-term aim, but it’s wider, kind of political agenda about it.  It’s about creating, what he calls “a big society”.  And he’s also been able to reckon in the short-term.  Some of the objectives are liberal democrats because in the British case this is very unusual that he is leading coalition government, so this is very tricky sort of act to of pull off. 

Ekaterina Kudashkina: But what about those recent  statements by Mr.Cameron, some controversial, so to say, statements? Is it a media campaign or is it really his problem? Meaning some experts describes it as inattention to details.  So, what is it?

Steven Fielding: I think he’s made one or two mistakes.  The kind of mistakes that I think some politicians make even those with a lot of experience.  The first one is about his description of Pakistan when he was in India.  That was misjudgment about the tradition of Pakistani government, and in India this did made a lot of troubles for him.  I think he also made some errors in the United States when  he called Britain “a junior partner” of the United States in 1940. These are one or two little errors that he has made, but I think in the broader sweep of what he’s done   he’s established an identity for his government, he’s made people at a moment anyway to accept his very taught agenda of cutting back on the state and he also tried to create a wider contact for the coalition government, so, it can maybe keep together in a longer term.  What he’s done it’s all about words.  It’s all about rhetoric at the moment. Because British government hasn’t really started to cut back and some of the things he’s mentioned in regards of rejoining troops on Afghanistan , these are things in the years ahead. So, I think he’s doing very well to frame what he wanted to do but he hasn’t actually done anything yet.

Sergei Strokan: Professor, you sound overly optimistic. But Cameron’s style seem to be putting of some of his coalition allies and there were reports that some of the conservatives have also been unhappy about his  failure to win the outride majority in the general election.  In this respect how would you describe the prospects for his government?

Steven Fielding:  I think that in the short-term he’s doing remarkably well.  But just in term of giving the coherence towards to his coalition government.  As I said the government hasn’t actually done anything. It’s announced various things that it will do, but it hasn’t actually started to cut back for example. When the government announced that in the long-tem it will do , which government departments will be cutting back most, and  all that things, people began to say “How much is going to be taken out of government spending?” I think, inevitably there will be problems, and there will be problems which will cut across the coalition, because liberal democrats do not want government spending to be cut back drastically, as some people from the conservatives.  So, he’s got a lot of difficult things. In recent hundred days he’s created a sort of map which is doing quite well with the wider British public.  But he hasn’t actually done anything yet. 

Sergei Strokan:  So what are the proposes? Just look how the things stand after another hundred days?

Steven Fielding:  Yes, it will be in the late autumn or early winter.

Sergei Strokan: Thank you for being with us, Professor.

Sergei Strokan:  Now we are joined by Konstantin Eggert, member of Royal Institute of International Relations. Mr.Eggert,  hundred days of Cameron’s government are still enigma. In your view, does he seem to be a new type of leader? 

Konstantin Eggert:  Well, I think he’s definitely a new type of leader. He’s much keener on reforming the party.  But I think that he’s moving too close to the center to be indentified clearly with the conservative ideology.  David Cameron is very much a European politician, someone who doesn’t like to express sharp opinions, and I think it can be either advantage or disadvantage at the same time.

Ekaterina Kudashkina: Mr.Eggert, what do you think about Mr. Cameron’s economic reforms? They do seem rather painful.

Konstantin Eggert:  Well, is there an alternative? I don’ think there is any. I think that in this case Mr. Cameron is very much speaking to conservative agenda but I don’t think that any Prime Minister would have had choice in these circumstances. These measures have to be taken. 

Ekaterina Kudashkina:  What are his relations with the liberal democrats?

Konstantin Eggert: Now we can’t say that there is any big trouble. I think that there is a certain possibility that this coalition will actually live three years that it promised to live or at least until the next parliamentary elections. Because I suppose that  Mr. Cameron represents to large extent the part of the conservative party that wants to be less conservative, and there are certain things that coincide with the liberal democratic view, including probably views on Europe including, foreign policy. I think there are quite a few similarities and, because Mr.Cameron desperately wants to move to the center, there is a  chance of cooperation with liberal democrats at least in the short-term perspective.  If  there is a split inside the coalition, than there is going to be another story. But now I think both David Cameron and Nick Clegg really want to hold on to the power and stay in one team.

Sergei Strokan:  Coming to foreign politics, can we expect at least some changes comparing to the time of Tony Blair?

Konstantin Eggert: I think that definitely there are certain things in British foreign policy that will remain the same, no matter who is the Prime Minister.  Mr.Cameron did very well with President Obama, at least much better than his  predecessor Mr.Brown,  who didn’t manage to establish any kind of personal contact with the US President.  I actually think that special relationships between the US and the UK will also continue. I think that the national interests of the United Kingdom are more or less defined and I don’t think that David Cameron is going to take drastic steps.

Sergei Strokan:  And what about Russia?

Konstantin Eggert: I suppose that the certain warming up of relations between Moscow and London started already under Gordon Brown  and it seems that it will continue under David Cameron.  Russia as such is not in the top-list of priorities of the British government, it is much moreconcerned with Pakistan, with the relations with the United States and with its complicated relations with Europe.  So, I think that to large extent the relations between Russia and Britain will remain what they are,  unless there is some kind of major crisis that will be on the horizon. I don’t see anything of this happening; British business is pretty active in Russia despite the crisis.

Sergei Strokan:  Thank you for being with us, Konstantin.